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WILLIAM W
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Introduction
During its 1992 term, the United States Supreme Court decided
Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services,' its first important summary judgment decision since the 1986 Supreme Court trilogy. 2 The
trilogy clarified the respective burdens on a party moving for summary judgment and the party opposing the motion. This Article discusses three issues: whether Kodak alters those burdens; whether
those burdens are properly understood by lower courts;3 and how the
decision in Kodak will affect discovery management in summary judgment cases.

* Senior United States District Judge, Northern District of California; Director,
Federal Judicial Center. A.B. 1948, University of Southern California; LL.B. 1951,
Harvard Law School.
** Senior Attorney/Writer, Federal Judicial Center. B.A. 1981, Amherst College;
J.D. 1985, Yale Law School.
The views expressed in this Article are those of the authors, not necessarily of the
Federal Judicial Center or its board.
1. 112 S.Ct. 2072 (1992).
2. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). For
analysis of the trilogy, see William W Schwarzer, Alan Hirsch, & David J. Barrans, The
Analysis and Decisionof Summary Judgment Motions, 139 F.R.D 441,477-81 (1992) [hereinafter Summary Judgment Motions].
3. This Article focuses on the situation presented when the motion for summary
judgment is made by the party not having the burden of persuasion at trial. When the
party having the trial burden makes a motion, its burden on summary judgment is
equivalent to the burden it would bear at trial.
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Kodak Case Background

To assess the significance of Kodak, its facts and procedural setting must be understood. 4 Kodak manufactures and sells copiers in
competition with a number of other manufacturers. It also sells service and replacement parts for its copiers. In the early 1980s, independent service organizations (ISOs) began servicing Kodak
copiers in competition with Kodak. Beginning in about 1985, Kodak
refused to sell parts to ISOs, limiting its sales to customers who performed their own service. Kodak also limited the ability of ISOs to
buy parts directly from the manufacturers. As a result, many customers using Kodak equipment who did not perform their own service
had to switch from ISOs to Kodak to obtain service and parts. Because they considered their access to the market for servicing Kodak
equipment to have been restricted, the ISOs sued Kodak, charging
violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.5
Kodak moved for summary judgment, arguing principally that because competition undisputedly exists in the market in which Kodak
sells original equipment, Kodak must be presumed to lack the requisite market power in the derivative markets for service and parts to
support a violation of the antitrust laws. Kodak supported its position
by arguing that prospective purchasers of new equipment would be
influenced by the cost of service and replacement parts for the equipment; as a result, any increase in profits from higher prices for parts
and service would be offset by lost profits from sales as consumers
purchased new equipment from other manufacturers with more attractive service costs. Because a finding of market power in the derivative service and parts markets absent power in the equipment market
"'simply makes no economic sense,"' 6 Kodak, invoking Matsushita
Electric Industrial v. Zenith Radio, maintained that it had established
7
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
4. The following account is based on the district court opinion, Image Technical
Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,402 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18,
1988), as well as on the personal observations of the trial judge, who is one of the authors

of this Article.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
6.
7.

Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2082 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587).
See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, in which the Court, in the course of granting

summary judgment, observed that plaintiff's economic theory "simply makes no economic
sense." Kodak supported its argument by relying on what it took to be plaintiffs' concession that customers take into account the cost of service in making decisions about
purchasing new equipment. See Daniel M. Wall, Kodak: A Personal Perspective, ANTITRUST, Fall/Winter 1992, at 4, 5.
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The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant Kodak.
Recognizing that Kodak may have a monopoly in the market for its
replacement parts and service, the court found that the ISOs had offered no facts reflecting an attempt by Kodak to use that position to
gain power in another market.8 The district court implicitly found
that the existence of competition in the market for new copiers precluded Kodak from having market power in the parts and service
market. 9
On appeal, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed.' 0 The
court held that a reasonable trier of fact could find that competition in
the equipment market did not curb Kodak's power in the parts and
service markets." In so holding, the court referred to evidence that
Kodak had charged twice as much as ISOs for lower quality service,
that competition from ISOs had driven down Kodak prices for service,
and that customers had been willing to pay higher prices for Kodak
equipment packages rather than switch to competitors.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit decision in an
opinion written by Justice Blackmun joined by five Justices.' 2 The
opinion states the principal issue as "whether [Kodak's] lack of market power in the primary equipment market precludes-as a matter of
law-the possibility of market power in derivative aftermarkets.' 3
The Court rejected Kodak's argument that it necessarily lacked market power in the service market because competition existed in the
equipment market. Pointing to evidence of a rise in service prices
without a corresponding decline in equipment sales, the Court observed that actual experience did not support Kodak's theory. Evidence of switching costs and information costs incurred by equipment
owners raised a question of fact about whether markets behaved in
accordance with Kodak's theory; the Court was unwilling to assume
that equipment purchase decisions were necessarily based on accurate
assessments of the total costs of equipment, service, and parts over the
8. Kodak, 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH),

68,402, at 60,212.

9. Id.at 60,212-13.
10. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990)
(2-1 decision), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
11. The Court also held that Kodak was not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' § 2 claim, finding issues of fact with respect to the relevant market and Kodak's business justification. Only the § 1 aspect of the case, however, is relevant to the procedural
analysis.
12. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2072 (1992). Two
Justices joined a dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia. Id. at 2092 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. Id.at 2076.
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equipment's life. 14 The Court also rejected Kodak's contention, based

on Matsushita,that presuming an absence of market power was necessary to avoid a significant risk of deterring procompetitive conduct.
Unlike the price cutting at issue in Matsushita, Kodak's restrictive ar15
rangements were regarded by the Court as facially anticompetitive.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that Kodak had not satisfied the bur-

den for summary judgment set forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure because Kodak failed to demonstrate that an
inference of power over the markets for parts and service is

unreasonable.

16

H. Summary Judgment Burdens
To examine Kodak's impact, if any, on the parties' summary judgment burdens,' 7 we begin with a brief review of the pre-Kodak law.
Celotex v. Catrett established that the moving party bears the burden

of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact,
8
but need not produce evidence to disprove the opponent's claim.' If

that burden is met, the burden shifts to the opponent to produce evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact. The opponent may
not rely on the allegations of the pleadings, but must set forth "'spe-

cific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'

' 19

Both Cel-

otex and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby20 direct courts to measure the

sufficiency of the opposition against the standard governing motions
for judgment as a matter of law: whether the facts are sufficient to

permit a reasonable jury to find for the opponent of the motion. 21
How does Kodak fit into this template for summary judgment?
14. Id. at 2086-87.
15. Id. at 2088.
16. Id. at 2089. Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted if "the
pleadings [and discovery and affidavits, if any] show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact." FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c).
17. Kodak's implications for substantive antitrust law relating to tying agreements and
monopolization have generated considerable controversy and uncertainty. See, e.g., PHU.LIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 1709.2 (Supp. 1993); Stephen Calkins, Supreme Court Antitrust 1991-92: The Revenge of the Amici, 61 ANTIrRUST
L.J. 269, 285-311 (1993); Thomas E. Kauper, Antitrust in 1992: The Year of the Storyteller,
61 ANTITRUST L.J. 347, 352-60 (1993). We can put those matters aside, however, to deal
with the procedural issues raised by the case.
18. 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
19. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
20. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
21. Under the recently amended Rule 50, judgment as a matter of law is the term
encompassing what had previously been directed verdicts and judgments notwithstanding
the verdict. FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
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The Court held that Kodak had failed to meet the requirements

of Rule 56(c)-that is, to "show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that [it] ...is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law." 22 It did so, in essence, because it rejected Kodak's contention

that the existence of competition in the equipment market precludes
the trier of fact, as a matter of law, from finding market power in the
aftermarket for parts and service. 23 Nothing in the Court's reasoning

suggests an intention to alter the burden on the moving party. In fact,
the Court's opinion does not address this question; it makes no reference to the operative language of Celotex or Anderson, and does not
say or imply that Kodak had the burden of disproving plaintiffs' case.
The Court simply declined Kodak's invitation to decide the issue of
antitrust liability as a matter of law, holding that the record before it
raised questions about the validity of the theory underlying Kodak's
contention that it necessarily lacked market power.24
While nothing in Kodak suggests impairment of the authority of
Celotex and Anderson, the case does raise questions about the proper
interpretation of Matsushita.25 In Matsushita, the Court held that a
reasonable jury could not infer the existence of a price-fixing conspiracy from evidence that the defendants, who had been parties to agreements that restrained competition in various respects other than the

sale of their products in the United States, cut prices to divert business
from plaintiffs. The Court upheld a summary judgment for defend-

ants on the ground that their price cutting was "as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy," and that evidence of
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
23. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2076.
24. The Court's reasoning does not rule out disposition by summary judgment of similar antitrust cases. A determination of the relevant market and the existence of market
power does not necessarily raise an issue for a jury. When the determination is made on a
record in which the evidentiary or historical facts are uncontroverted and the question
concerns the conclusions to be drawn from undisputed evidence, the question may be one
of ultimate fact appropriate for summary judgment. This is because such questions may
involve policy rather than ad hoc factual determinations. See Summary JudgmentMotions,
supranote 2, at 454-63. In Kodak, however, the record had not been adequately developed
in the trial court to sustain such a determination. The evidence offered by plaintiffs, consisting largely of reports from consumers who had switched to Kodak for service though
they preferred ISOs (which charged lower prices for higher quality service), and the
Supreme Court's own views of market imperfections, persuaded the Court that the question of market power could not be decided as a pure question of law on the record before
it. The Court left open what kind of evidence would be necessary to establish market
imperfections sufficient to sustain a finding of market power. It clearly did not decide that
the existence of any market imperfections suffices to raise a triable issue as to market
power. See AREEDA & HovEmNKAM, supra note 17, § 1709.2b.
25. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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such conduct "does not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy. '26 Kodak argued that, like the defendants in Matsushita, it had no incentive to exploit market power over parts and
service because doing so would cause it to sustain losses on equipment
sales with no foreseeable gains.
But the Court rejected this reasoning. Though it acknowledged
that "[i]f the plaintiff's theory is economically senseless, no reasonable
jury could find in its favor, and summary judgment should be
granted," 27 the Court went on to say that Kodak "must show that despite evidence of increased prices and excluded competition, an inference of market power is unreasonable. '"2 8 As the Kodak Court
observed, defendants' conduct in Matsushita was procompetitive,
since price cutting to increase business is "the very essence of competition. '2 9 In contrast, Kodak's restriction on the sale of parts, which
lead to higher service prices and market foreclosure, created no presumption of lawful motive. Noting that Kodak's policy could not be
assumed to always or almost always enhance competition, and weighing "the risk of deterring procompetitive behavior by proceeding to
trial against the risk that illegal behavior go unpunished," the Court
'30
concluded that "the balance tips against summary judgment.
One lesson of Kodak, which perhaps should have been apparent
all along, is that summary judgment motions based on the "implausibility" of the opponent's claim will rarely succeed. As we explained in
an earlier piece:
Some language in Matsushitasuggests that summary judgment is appropriate where a plaintiff's case rests on "implausible" inferences.
Courts should use care in accepting this language at face value when
ruling on summary judgment motions. In the context of the case,
the Matsushita Court was addressing not the credibility of disputed
historical evidence but whether3it1 was plausible to infer a conspiracy
from normal business conduct.
Matsushita, we observed, rather than making a statement about implausible inferences in summary judgment motions generally, rests on
a specific point of antitrust law: Plaintiffs cannot prevail if their case
requires inferring a price-fixing conspiracy from normal business ac26.
27.
28.
cating a
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 588.
Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2083.
Id. As the earlier discussion shows, that statement cannot be interpreted as indichange in the rules governing the burden on the moving party.
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594.
Kodak, 112 S.Ct. at 2088-89.
Summary Judgment Motions, supra note 2, at 491 (citations omitted).
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tivity (specifically, price cutting) that, standing alone, is consistent
32
with lawful competition.
It is reasonable to conclude from Kodak that, once an antitrust
defendant moves beyond established substantive law principles that
limit the range of permissible inferences and seeks summary judgment
based on economic theory, the defendant "bears a substantial burden
in showing that.., despite evidence of increased prices and excluded

competition, [plaintiff's inference] of market power [drawn from defendant's conduct] is unreasonable. '33 If defendant's theory rests on
an asserted risk of deterring procompetitive behavior, and the
procompetitive effects of the conduct do not on their face outweigh
any possible anticompetitive effects, the burden rests on the defendant to show that the risks of deterring procompetitive behavior by
forcing defendant to trial outweigh the risks that illegal conduct will
go unpunished.3 4 As discussed in the next section, Kodak certainly

rejects the view that Matsushita affords an across-the-board defense
for antitrust defendants whenever the conduct complained of can be
considered economically justified business conduct.
Nevertheless, substantive law may limit the range of permissible
inferences to be drawn from particular evidence, and thus define the

moving party's burden. This principle underlies Anderson's holding
that in defamation actions by public figures substantive First Amendment law forbids an inference of malice from negligently prepared
stories. 35 Kodak does not repudiate this principle, 36 but does remind
32. Id. at 491-92. That is not to say that substantive antitrust law might not have
supported summary judgment in Kodak. As Justice Scalia points out in dissent, when a
manufacturer lacks power in the interbrand market for that equipment, there are compelling arguments against the imposition of per se liability for tying arrangements on, and
against the application of the strictures against monopolization to, a manufacturer's restrictions on sales of parts for equipment it manufactures. Kodak, 112 S.Ct. at 2093-2101
(Scalia, J., dissenting). (Kodak came before the Supreme Court as a per se case under § 1
of the Sherman Act and raised no issue concerning application of the rule of reason to
defendant's conduct.) But in the face of evidence suggesting the possibility of adverse
effects on competition in the market (Le., higher prices for lower quality service), the majority declined to adopt such a substantive rule that limits the range of permissible inferences from the alleged conduct. That, of course, was a decision concerning substantive
antitrust law, not summary judgment procedure.
33. Kodak, 112 S.Ct. at 2083.
34. Id. at 2088-89; see also In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2274 (1991)
(adopting this interpretation of Matsushita).
35. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
36. See Kodak, 112 S.Ct. at 2083 n.14. The court cited Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, as
well as Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984), which held that
no inference of conspiracy is permissible when evidence showed only that defendant termi-

8
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us that its application depends upon a record sufficient to assure a
court that applying the principle to the facts of the case is
37
appropriate.
While there is no reason to believe the Kodak Court intended to
alter the burden on the party moving for summary judgment, the
question arises whether it intended to lighten the burden on the opponent of the motion. The Court's rejection of summary judgment
rested on plaintiffs' sparse evidence of supracompetitive prices
charged by Kodak. Could Kodak be read as a retreat from the standard announced in Celotex and Anderson requiring the opponent of
the motion to come forward with evidence sufficient to sustain a jury
verdict?
The Ninth Circuit opinion, reversing summary judgment, recites
that "ISOs offered service for as little as half of Kodak's price....
Kodak in some cases cut its price for service. Some customers found
ISO service superior to Kodak service. '38 It goes on to say:
While [plaintiffs] have not conducted a market analysis and pinpointed specific imperfections in the ...markets ...[i]t is enough
that [they] ...have presented evidence of actual events from which
a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Kodak has power in
the interbrand market and that competition in the interbrand mar39
ket does not, in reality, curb Kodak's power in the parts market.
Without discussion of the standard governing the sufficiency of the
opposition to summary judgment, the court held that the evidence offered by plaintiffs was sufficient to raise a material issue of fact about
40
market power.
There is, however, reason to doubt that the anecdotal and fragmentary evidence of market power (based on "actual events" but devoid of market analysis) recited in the Ninth Circuit's opinion is
sufficient to defeat summary judgment under the standard established
by Anderson.41 One commentary on Kodak expresses this view:
nated dealer after receiving complaints about price-cutting, and First Nat'l Bank v. Cities
Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968), which held that plaintiff's and defendants' interests
were aligned in an alleged boycott situation.
37. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the impact of the limited record on the
Court's decision.
38. Kodak, 903 F.2d at 614.
39. Id. at 617.

40.

Id. at 618.

41.

See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 (holding that a "scintilla" of evidence is insufficient

to defeat a summary judgment motion; rather, the nonmoving party needs evidence that
would support a verdict at trial) (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.)
442, 448 (1872)).
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[I]n the absence of a showing of non-episodic anticompetitive effects probative of market power, summary judgment should still be
granted if a defendant shows that no reasonable trier of fact viewing
the record as a whole could accept a plaintiff's contention that
aftermarkets are non-responsive to foremarket competition. For instance, if price discrimination is the alleged mechanism by which
informational imperfections are manifested, plaintiffs should be
compelled to adduce evidence of costs. Similarly, to sustain a lockin theory, plaintiffs should be required to establish the relative
unimportance of new buyers ....[T]he Kodak Court ...cited no
42
evidence on this question ....
This criticism is more appropriately directed at the Ninth Circuit's
opinion than the Supreme Court's, which is properly read as passing
on a proposed rule of law, not on the sufficiency of evidence to sustain
a verdict.43 Had the Court simply adopted the Ninth Circuit's analysis, questions about the viability of Anderson, at least in the antitrust
context, might have been implicated. 44 By neither adopting the Ninth
Circuit's analysis nor casting its discussion of market power in terms
of the sufficiency of the evidence to raise a triable issue, the Court
demonstrated that it did not intend to alter the opponent's burden
under Anderson. Rather than concerning itself with the application of
Rule 56's requirement that "an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the
adverse party's response.., must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial, '45 the Court simply laid to rest any
notion that plaintiffs in antitrust cases bear a special burden to defeat
a summary judgment motion:
[Matsushita] did not introduce a special burden on plaintiffs facing
summary judgment in antitrust cases ....Matsushita demands only
that the nonmoving party's inferences be reasonable in order to

42. The Supreme Court, 1991 Tern-Leading Cases, 106 HARV.L. REv. 328, 335
(1992) (footnotes omitted).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
44. The difference between the Ninth Circuit's analysis and the Supreme Court's,
though subtle, is critical to understanding Kodak. Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court rejected the contention that a competitive primary market necessarily precludes
market power in a derivative market. 903 F.2d at 617; 112 S. Ct. at 2084. And both courts
took note of the evidence of market imperfections adduced by plaintiffs. 903 F.2d at 617;
112 S. Ct. at 2081. However, the Ninth Circuit explicitly found that this limited evidence
sufficed to raise a triable issue. 903 F.2d at 617. The Supreme Court made no such finding.
It held only that, on the limited record before it (based on truncated discovery), the possibility of a triable issue could not be ruled out. 112 S.Ct. at 2087. The significance of the
limited nature of the record is discussed infra Part IV.
45. FED. R. Crv. P. 56(e).
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reach the jury, a requirement
46 that was not invented, but merely articulated, in that decision.

It is therefore reasonable to conclude that, insofar as it was concerned with summary judgment procedure at all, the Court intended
not to raise new barriers to summary judgment (and thus tacitly depart from its prior rulings), but merely to clarify the application of
Matsushita.47 The Court's denial of summary judgment was based primarily on its interpretation of antitrust law; it involved no tinkering
48
with Celotex and Anderson.
MH.

The Understanding of Summary Judgment Burdens

Among the Lower Courts
While Kodak does not impair the continuing precedential vitality
of Celotex and Anderson, confusion about the parties' burdens under
Rule 56 occasionally arises in lower courts, creating a risk that Kodak
will be misconstrued. The decision by a panel of the Eleventh Circuit
in Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc.,49 though predating Kodak, is a troubling illustration of the problem.
In Clark, plaintiffs alleged they were terminated in order to deprive them of pension and retirement benefits in violation of federal
statutes. 50 Defendant moved for and was granted summary judgment.
As described in the court of appeals' opinion, the trial court ruled:
with respect to one claim, plaintiffs failed to "'establish even a prima
facie case that the defendant was motivated by a specific intent to
deprive the plaintiffs of pension benefits" 5 1; with respect to a second,
the facts did not "'rise to the level of "extreme and outrageous" conduct required to constitute an intentional infliction of emotional distress" 5 2; with respect to the third claim, defendant had presented
46.

Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2083.

47. Subsequent courts have not read Kodak as announcing a change in the law. See,
e.g., Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3rd Cir. 1992);
Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1490, 1495 (8th Cir. 1992). It is also significant that the Court's opinion nowhere cites Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144

(1970), or Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962), cases representing the restrictive view of summary judgment prior to the trilogy.
48. The Court was also influenced by the incomplete state of the record. See infra
Part IV.
49. 929 F.2d 604 (11th Cir. 1991).
50. For a complete factual and procedural background of the case, see id. at 605-06.
51. Id. at 606 (quoting the district court opinion).
52. Id.

November 1993]

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AFTER EASTMAN KODAK

valid reasons for the termination and plaintiffs had not and could not
"'establish that the reasons.., were simply pretextual.' ' 53
Plaintiffs appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit reversed. However,
its opinion provides little by way of context: The court describes
neither the factual showing made in support of the motion nor the
opposition, contenting itself with brief quotes from the trial court's
54

order.

The court of appeals saw the district court's determination as reflecting an improper view of the burden on the moving party, and devoted almost its entire opinion to a discussion of that burden. In
reversing the summary judgment, the court relied principally on
Adickes v. S.H.Kress & Co.55 and the notion that the moving party
must disprove an essential element of the nonmoving party's case.
Though the Supreme Court rejected such a rule in Celotex, the Eleventh Circuit held that Adickes "remained the generally applicable
rule," 56 while Celotex was an exceptional case, limited to "the unusual
situation.., where neither party could prove either the affirmative or
the negative of an essential element of the claim. '57 Testing the validity of such a view requires a brief look at Adickes as well as Celotex.
In Adickes, a chain store had refused to serve a white schoolteacher and her black students at its lunch counter, and the teacher
was arrested for vagrancy upon leaving the store. 58 She brought suit
alleging that the police had conspired with the storeowner to violate
her civil rights. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing
that "'uncontested facts' established that no conspiracy existed." 59
Plaintiff opposed defendant's motion with no direct evidence of a conspiracy, arguing only that defendant failed to refute the allegation that
the policeman who later arrested her was present in the store at the
time of the incident, and that this sufficed for a jury to infer a conspiracy.60 The district court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment, but was reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground that
defendant, having failed "to foreclose the possibility that there was a
53. Id.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
55. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
56. Clark, 929 F.2d at 608.
57. Id at 607. The court added that "[e]ven after Celotex it is never enough simply to
state that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial." Id. at 608. This statement
is unexceptionable, but it is not possible to ascertain from the court's opinion whether that
was all the moving party had done in that case.
58. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 146-47.
59. Id. at 153.
60. Id at 156-57.
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policeman in the ... store while [plaintiff] was awaiting service, and
that this policeman reached an understanding with some Kress employee that [plaintiff] not be served," 6 1 had "failed to carry its burden
'62
of showing the absence of any genuine issue of fact."
Prior to Celotex, most courts and commentators had read Adickes
as requiring a moving party to disprove the opponent's claim in order
to obtain summary judgment, even if the nonmoving party would have
the burden of proof at trial. In Celotex, however, the Court rejected
that interpretation. It explained Adickes as resting not on defendant's
failure to disprove plaintiff's case, but rather on plaintiff's having adduced sufficient evidence-the presence of the policeman in the
store-from which a jury could infer a conspiracy. 63 The Celotex
Court made clear that a moving defendant need not affirmatively disprove plaintiff's case:
[W]e do not think the Adickes language.., should be construed to
mean that the burden is on the party moving for summary judgment
to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even with respect to an issue on which the nonmoving
party bears the burden of proof. Instead, as we have explained, the
burden on the moving party may be discharged by "showing"-that
is, pointing out to the district court-that there64is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.
That showing may be made without submission of affidavits, simply by
pointing to relevant pleadings or other materials on file. 65
Returning to Clark v. Coats & Clark, the Eleventh Circuit may
have reached the correct result in reversing summary judgment, 66 but
its analysis of the burden on the moving party seems contrary to the
letter and spirit of Celotex and Anderson. The Eleventh Circuit im61. Id. at 157.
62. Id. at 153.
63. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
64. Id. While dissenting on other grounds, Justice Brennan agreed that the party not
having the burden of persuasion at trial
may satisfy Rule 56's burden of production in either of two ways. First, [it] may
submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving
party's claim. Second, the moving party may demonstrate to the Court that the
nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the
nonmoving party's claim.
Id. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 323.
66. It is impossible to evaluate this result since the court did not describe the factual
showings of the parties. Similarly, the court may have been correct in stating that summary
judgment motions too often are filed without supporting materials sufficient to demonstrate the absence of a triable issue, 929 F.2d at 608-09 n.8, though data on this point are
lacking.
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plies that the moving party must, except in "unusual situations," come
forward with evidence disproving the opponent's case. 67 Moreover,
the court by implication rejected the Supreme Court's clearly stated
view that summary judgment "is properly regarded not as a disfavored
procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules
as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."' 68 The panel's willingness to

write off Celotex as an unusual case, and its reversal of summary judgment without reference to the relevant facts of the case, recall the

wariness (if not downright hostility) toward summary judgment common prior to the trilogy. 69 The Eleventh Circuit's analysis also illustrates the obstacles summary judgment continues to encounter in
70
lower courts.

IV. Discovery Management After Kodak
There remains the question of Kodak's impact on discovery management in summary judgment proceedings. Even putting Matsushita
aside, the Court might still have affirmed summary judgment for Kodak on the ground that plaintiffs' fragmentary and anecdotal evidence
of market power offered in opposition to the motion was insufficient
to sustain a jury verdict. As noted above, the Supreme Court did not
say that plaintiffs had met their burden as opponents of the motion.
67. Id.at 607. In addition, the court's view of the nonmovant's burden may conflict
with Anderson and Celotex. The court rejected as erroneous the statement in appellant's
brief that "'in attempting to withstand summary judgment, not only does the non-moving
party have the burden of proving the existence of every element essential to his or her
case, but the non-moving party must produce sufficiently probative evidence upon which a
jury could reasonably find in its favor."' Id at 609 (quoting Appellant's Brief). It is impossible to determine from the opinion whether the court meant to reject this standard generally or only its application in circumstances where the moving party had failed to meet its
burden.
68. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
69. See Summary Judgment Motions, supra note 2, at 446-52.
70. The impact of Clark may be attenuated by a subsequent Eleventh Circuit en banc
opinion that accurately summarizes the governing law and quotes the majority in Celotex
stating that the moving party, to meet its burden, need only "'show[ ]'-that is, point[ ] out
to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's
case." United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437-38 (11th Cir.
1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Outside the Eleventh Circuit, Clark was cited
with approval in Russ v. International Paper Co., 943 F.2d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 1991), which,
however, affirmed a summary judgment. One commentator described Clark as "a positive
step toward explaining the commonly misunderstood and misapplied holding of Celotex,"
which "also may help to ensure that summary judgment will be cautiously invoked." James
V. Chin, Note, Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc.: The Eleventh Circuit Clarifiesthe InitialBurden in a Motion for Summary Judgment, 26 GA. L. Rev. 1009, 1023 (1992).
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The most reasonable interpretation of the Court's decision is that the
evidence produced by plaintiffs was sufficient to raise doubts about
Kodak's theory, making the Court unwilling to accept that theory as a
7
matter of law on a record based on only truncated discovery. '
Kodak filed its summary judgment motion before plaintiffs had
initiated discovery. Following a status conference, the district court
limited plaintiffs to one set each of interrogatories and requests for
production and not more than four depositions (later increased to six)
of persons with information pertaining to the issues raised by and material to the summary judgment motion. Not until plaintiffs filed their
opposition to the motion did they request leave to conduct additional
discovery. Rule 56(f) permits the nonmoving party to obtain more
time for discovery by submitting an affidavit stating why it "cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's
opposition. '72 However, since plaintiffs did not specify how additional discovery they sought would help them oppose the motion in
light of the issues as they appeared in the district court, the court de73
nied the request.
These limitations on discovery played a major part in plaintiffs'
briefing on appeal,7 4 and not without effect. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the record on the issue of market power was "not fully
developed"7 5 because "only very limited discovery" had been permitted on that issue. 76 At oral argument before the Supreme Court,
some Justices expressed concern about making a decision on the limited factual record.77 The Court's opinion, like that of the Ninth Circuit, noted the limitations on discovery and the insufficiently
developed record, 78 and concluded summary judgment was inappropriate "on a record this sparse. '79 It is quite likely, then, that some
Justices joined the majority opinion not because plaintiffs had
71. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, § 1709.2; Calkins, supra note 17, at
297; supra text accompanying notes 23-24.

72. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
73. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
68,402, at 60,213 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1988).
74. See Mark E. Weber, Summary Judgment after Kodak, ATrrITRusT, Fall/Winter
1992, at 11.
75. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 617 (9th Cir.
1990).
76. Id. at 617 n.4.
77. Wall, supra note 7, at 5-6.
78. Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2079 & n.4 (1992).
79. Id. at 2092.
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presented strong evidence, but rather because they had been precluded from developing more. 80
So viewed, Kodak illustrates the dilemma that frequently confronts district courts faced with summary judgment motions. Limiting
discovery can, on the one hand, lead to reversal of a summary judgment on appeal. Failure to limit discovery, on the other hand, defeats
the purpose of summary judgment-to help bring about the expeditious and economical resolution of cases that do not require a trial. In
Celotex the Court described summary judgment as "an integral part of
the Federal Rules... which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action."' 81 The demand for
reducing the cost and delay of litigation is more insistent than ever.
The Civil Justice Reform Act8 2 is only the most prominent manifestation of a strong public policy to bring cost and delay under control,
and discovery is the major cause of that cost and delay. 83 Controlling
the scope and volume of discovery is an integral part of judicial case
management; failure to do so is now regarded as an avoidance of judicial responsibility. 84
Kodak cannot be taken to imply that summary judgment is premature unless all discovery has been completed. 85 In Celotex, the
Court said that "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry
of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
80. An attorney in the case speculates that this is exactly what happened, noting that
two of the Justices who expressed concern about the state of the record at oral argument,
the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, both joined the majority opinion although their
previously expressed views on antitrust suggested they might do otherwise. Wall, supra
note 7, at 5-6.
81. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CrV. P. 1).
82. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. III 1991).
83. See A. Leo Levin & Denise D. Colliers, Containingthe Cost of Litigation, 37
RurGERS L. Rnv. 219, 229 (1985); Roy D. Simon, Jr., The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. R-v. 1, 66 & n.296 (1985); John K. Setear, Comment, Comments on Judges'
Opinions on Procedural Issues, 69 B.U. L. REv. 765, 768 (1989); Briefly Speaking, MICH.
LAW. WKLY., Mar. 9, 1992, at 3 (reporting that in a national survey of 800 attorneys,
judges, administrators, and legislators, 54% said that over half of all litigation costs are
associated with the discovery process); J.W. Brown, Reform Seeks to Tame Costs of Lawsuits, THE PHOENiX GAzErrE, Jan. 2, 1992, at B2.
84. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods... shall be limited by the court .... ") (emphasis added).
85. See, e.g., Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993) (holding that trial court correctly restricted discovery and granted
summary judgment because factors concerning a plaintiffs economic motivation for filing
suit were irrelevant to the legal reasonableness of the litigation).
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the existence of an element essential to [its] case."'86 In Anderson, the
Court noted that summary judgment should be refused "where the
nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information
that is essential to his opposition.'8 7 Inevitably district judges must use
their discretion to determine what is "adequate time" and "essential
to [the] opposition." Summary judgment usually turns on specific isolable issues that can be dispositive. To require, in every case, that all
discovery relevant to all issues in the case be completed before a motion may be entertained would undermine the purpose of Rule 56 and
frustrate Rule l's goal of "secur[ing] the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination" of litigation. Thus, the settled practice is to permit the
parties to conduct only discovery material to the issues raised by the
motion. 88
Rule 56(f) helps implement this approach. It permits the opponent to obtain time for additional discovery "[s]hould it appear from
[its] affidavits ...that [it] cannot for reasons stated present ... facts
essential to justify [its] opposition" to the motion. 89 Courts have consistently required the party seeking a continuance to specify the discovery it proposes to take, the evidence likely to be uncovered, and
the issues of material fact the evidence will support.90 There is good
reason for such a requirement for, as explained below, in its absence
the trial court could be held hostage to the losing party's whims on
appeal.
Although the practice under Rule 56(f) is settled and generally
serves well, it is not free of problems. Kodak illustrates how the management of discovery in the face of a summary judgment motion can
become a trap for the trial judge. The case appeared to the district
court to be governed by a straightforward legal proposition-that an
undisputedly competitive equipment market precluded the existence
in the parts and service market of the requisite market power for an
antitrust violation 9 1-which obviated the need for further discovery.
In addition, plaintiffs did not explain how or what particular discovery
86. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (emphasis added).
87. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 n.5 (1986) (emphasis added).
88. See id. at 248 ("As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are
material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.").
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
90. See, e.g., Keebler Co. v. Murray Bakery Prods., 866 F.2d 1386, 1388-90 (Fed.Cir.
1989); Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 139-40 (3d Cir. 1988); VISA Int'l Serv. Assn.
v. Bankcard Holders of Am., 784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986).
91. As noted, one Ninth Circuit judge and three Supreme Court Justices agreed with
this view. See supra notes 10 & 12.
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would enable them to raise a material issue of fact.92 But as the posture of the case changed on appeal, and the focus shifted to the alleged tying of service to parts, new factual issues became material and
a need for a record arose that did not exist before. 93
Had plaintiffs in the trial court focused on the contention that
prevailed on appeal and made a particularized showing under Rule
56(f) of the need for specific discovery, the district court might have
interpreted the applicable antitrust law differently. As a result, the
record on market issues that the Supreme Court found lacking might
have been made. Instead, the case experienced a not-uncommon metamorphosis on appeal: The association of new counsel, combined
with additional time for reflection on the adverse ruling below, led to
a refinement of theory, a change of emphasis, and ultimately the rejection of the trial court's view of the substantive law. 94 The unsurprising
result was to render the trial court's summary judgment record inadequate for the appellate court.
It would be an unfortunate overreaction, however, to conclude
that the trial judge should never restrict discovery, regardless of how
reasonable this may be in light of the contentions of the parties and
the judge's view of the law. That a judge may on appeal turn out to
have been in error is not reason enough to abandon enlightened case
management. The obligation remains to balance the cost and delay
proposed discovery would inflict against the likelihood that it would
have a material bearing on the case. 95 The challenge is to discharge
that obligation well-to serve the purposes of efficiency and economy,
as well as fairness, while minimizing the risk of reversal.
The most important tool available to the judge, and useful protection against error, is the diligent and effective use of the issue identifi92. See Kodak, 903 F.2d at 617 n.4.
93. As the appellate court recognized, "Not finding it necessary to reach the market
power issue in its decision, the district court, of course, had no reason to grant this [discovery] request." Id.
94. In theory, at least, a claim not raised in the trial court is barred on appeal, but
courts tend to apply waiver rules flexibly. See, e.g., Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d 798, 802 n.3
(2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting waiver argument because the theory advanced for the first time on
appeal was "an additional argument relating to a point already under dispute," rather than
a new claim), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2347 (1993).
95. The pending proposed amendment of Rule 26(b)(2) states that the "frequency or
extent of use of the discovery methods ... shallbe limited by the court if it determines that
... the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking
into account... the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(2) (Proposed Amend. 1993) (emphasis added).
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cation process. Rule 16 conferences 96 serve this purpose, but only
when the parties are thoroughly prepared and the judge presses for
the full disclosure of theories and facts that will allow an informed
determination of what discovery is needed to make an adequate record for decision. Permitting the case to proceed in the trial court on
legal theories and factual analyses that are inadequately developed
and disclosed invites reversal on appeal.
Before a motion for summary judgment is entertained, the positions of the parties should be clearly set out. However, the pleadings
will often be insufficient to accomplish this goal. In a case of any complexity, the judge may need to question counsel and press them to
commit themselves clearly and unambiguously to their theories of the
case. This approach may seem an unnatural tack to take. Judgesburdened with more work than they have time to do-are inclined to
take the case as presented on the papers and let the parties suffer the
consequences of their ambiguities or oversights. But Kodak suggests
that taking time for a more active and searching inquiry into the basis
for the motion and the opposition-particularly in complex casesmay in the long run make summary judgment more cost-effective.
Confronted with an inadequately supported Rule 56(f) request
for further discovery, the judge might consider questioning counsel
about the purpose and expected product of the requested discovery to
determine whether a reasonable though undisclosed basis for the request exists. 97 Other innovative approaches may be considered, such
as a preliminary hearing, perhaps held in an informal setting somewhat resembling a seminar. This approach could be useful in any
complex litigation. In an antitrust case, for example, the court could
use an informal hearing to obtain clarification on such matters as market definition and the nature of the alleged restraint, in order to gain a
more informed basis for procedural rulings.
Pleadings are not the most effective means for communication.
Cases are not always what they seem. Though the pressure of heavy
dockets causes judges to speed their cases to conclusion, it is well from
time to time to stop, look, and listen, to let the wheels spin a bit
longer, and to hope that a slight delay might cause additional light to
appear.
96. Rule 16 allows a judge to call one or more pretrial conferences in order to discuss,
among other things, "the formulation and simplification of the issues." FED. R. Civ. P.
16(c)(1).
97. See WILLIAM W SCHWARZER & ALAN HIRSCH, THE ELEMENTS OF CASE MANAGEMENT 5-6 (Federal Judicial Ctr. 1991).
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So far we have considered discovery by the opponent of the motion. But the Eleventh Circuit's resurrection of Adickes raises a further question concerning the moving party's discovery. While
controversy over discovery, as in Kodak, generally concerns whether
the nonmoving party was given an adequate opportunity, debate over
the moving party's burden raises a related question: whether the
moving party should be required to conduct certain discovery before
filing its motion. In his Celotex dissent, Justice Brennan points out
that showing the nonmoving party's lack of evidence "may require the
moving party to depose the nonmoving party's witnesses."9 It is, of
course, not remarkable for the moving party to conduct discovery to
determine whether the opponent can support a particular claim or defense. The product of such discovery is commonly produced in support of the motion.
One commentator, however, has read a much broader obligation
into Justice Brennan's language. She warns that parties must be prevented from using summary judgment to circumvent the normal discovery process and "force an opponent to reveal his case." 99 She
reads the concurrence and dissent in Celotex as clarifying that
the party seeking to rely on the absence of record evidence as a
basis for summary judgment has an obligation to pursue leads obtained in discovery. Any other rule would vitiate the incentive to do
thorough discovery before moving for summary judgment and
would encourage the use of summary judgment to harass the nonmoving party or to force him to disclose his case prematurely. 10 0
The notion that parties are unfairly disadvantaged by having to
reveal their case "prematurely" is obsolete under modern case management regimes, especially as the courts move toward early,
mandatory disclosure. Forcing parties to conduct comprehensive discovery that may turn out to be unnecessary is equally out of step with
the times. Requiring the movant to "pursue leads obtained in discovery" in order to learn whether the opponent might have a case would,
in effect, reinstate the burden that courts had read into Adickes (that
the movant disprove the opponent's case) 01 ' and would be inconsistent with the time and cost saving purposes of Rule 56 and the reasoning underlying Celotex. The extent of discovery by the movant,
98. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 332 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. Melissa L. Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment after

Celotex, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 53, 66 (1988).
100. Id. at 68.
101. See Summary Judgment Motions, supra note 2, at 449-51.
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therefore, should be determined in light of what, in the circumstances
of the case, is necessary to demonstrate the absence of a triable issue.
As Justice Brennan pointed out, making such a determination may
sometimes require allowing the movant to depose adverse witnesses,
02
call for the production of documents, and seek other information.
But if the movant can carry its burden without resort to such measures, there is no reason to require them.
Discovery should be treated as a case management concern
rather than a conceptual matter. Although discovery tends to avoid
surprise at trial and promote early settlement, it also increases costs
and breeds other vices. The initial decisions about discovery are for
counsel, but the court has a well-settled responsibility to provide judicial supervision and control in order to avoid unnecessary cost and
delay. As discussed above, the decisions the court must make are
often complicated by uncertainty surrounding the parties' theories
and the controlling law. Abdication of the judge's responsibility, however, is not a desirable way of finessing these difficulties. Instead, the
judge should make wise use of the available case management devices
10 3
and techniques.
Conclusion
Summary judgment is a case management tool. Like any tool, it
should be used with care and only in the appropriate circumstances.
There are few clear and firm guidelines for its use, and Kodak suggests
some of the hazards that courts need to anticipate. But that is not
reason to put summary judgment at the bottom of the judge's tool
chest. Properly used, summary judgment offers substantial benefits
for the parties and the courts, but such use entails thought, planning,
and an understanding of its place in the system of procedural rules.

102.
103.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL 21-39 (Federal Judicial Ctr. 1992).

